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Determining when it is safe to fly a crew on a launch vehicle/spacecraft for the first time, especially when the test flight 
is a part of the overall system certification process, has long been a challenge for program decision makers.  The 
decision on first flight is ultimately the judgment of the program and agency management in conjunction with the 
design and operations team.  To aid in this decision process, a NASA team undertook the task to develop a generic 
framework for evaluating whether any given program or commercial provider has sufficiently complete and balanced 
plans in place to allow crewmembers to safely fly on human spaceflight systems for the first time. It was the team’s goal 
to establish a generic framework that could easily be applied to any new system, although the system design and 
intended mission would require specific assessment.  
 
Historical data shows that there are multiple approaches that have been successful in first flight with crew. These 
approaches have always been tailored to the specific system design, mission objectives, and launch environment.  
Because specific approaches may vary significantly between different system designs and situations, prescriptive 
instructions or thorough checklists cannot be provided ahead of time.  There are, however, certain general approaches 
that should be applied in thinking through the decision for first flight.   
 
This paper addresses some of the most important factors to consider when developing a new system or evaluating an 
existing system for whether or not it is safe to fly humans to/from space.  In the simplest terms, it is time to fly crew for 
the first time when it is safe to do so and the benefit of the crewed flight is greater than the residual risk.  This is rarely a 
straight-forward decision. The paper describes the need for experience, sound judgment, close involvement of the 
technical and management teams, and established decision processes.  In addition, the underlying level of confidence 
the manager has in making the decision will also be discussed. By applying the outlined thought processes and 
approaches to a specific design, test program and mission objectives, a project team will be better able to focus the 
debate and discussion on critical areas for consideration and added scrutiny – allowing decision makers to adequately 
address the first crewed flight decision.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Historical data shows that there are multiple 
approaches that have been successful for determining 
readiness for the first crewed flight.  Every approach 
has to be tailored to the specific system design and 
situation of that particular system and mission 
objectives.  Because specific approaches may vary 
significantly between different system designs, 
prescriptive instructions or thorough checklists 
cannot be developed to apply to all possible human 
spacecraft systems.  There are, however, certain 
guiding principles that should be applied when 
developing the first crewed flight decision.   
 
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) 
developed a generic framework for evaluating 
whether any given program has sufficiently complete 
and balanced plans in place to allow crewmembers to 
fly safely on a human spaceflight system for the first 
time (i.e., first crewed flight).  This framework, 
presented here, includes important factors to consider 
when developing a new system or evaluating an 
existing system for the first crewed flight.  By 
applying the following framework to a specific 
design, test program, and intended mission 
objectives, decision makers will have better 
information with which to make the decision for first 
crewed flight.   
 
The question of when to fly crew for the first time is 
evaluated at many stages through the development of 
the human spaceflight system—first during the 
planning stages and then throughout development 
and testing and at major milestones.  In general 
terms, the system is ready to fly when residual risk† 
has been mitigated to the point where it is 
outweighed by the need to fly the first crew.  This is 
rarely a straight-forward, clear-cut trade off so 
experience, sound judgment, and established (and 
clearly documented) decision-making processes are 
essential.  In addition, the underlying level of 
confidence the manager has in making the decision 
must be considered.   
 
The decision on first flight is ultimately the judgment 
of the program and Agency management in 
conjunction with the design and operations team.  
                                                 
† In this paper, residual risk is defined as the risk 
remaining after other known risks have been 
eliminated, managed, mitigated, or accepted 
There is, however, some general guidance that can be 
used in making these judgments.  Close involvement 
of the technical and management teams throughout 
the design and development process is essential.  
Verification and validation (V&V) of safety-critical 
systems and survival functions are required.  Based 
on previous experience, historical perspectives, and 
best practices, this paper will illustrate a top-level 
thought process for making a first flight decision and 
will help focus the debate and discussion on critical 
areas for consideration and additional scrutiny. 
 
 
II. NEED FOR FIRST CREWED FLIGHT 
 
Given that the human spaceflight system is designed 
for human spaceflight, it is accepted that the 
objective is to fly humans when risks to crew safety 
have been mitigated to the point where the need or 
benefit is worth the residual risks.  The effort then 
shifts to deciding WHEN it is safe to fly crew, not IF 
a crew should fly.    
 
Senior leaders and decision makers must evaluate the 
specific test objectives for the mission to determine 
the need for a crew.  Once this need has been 
established, the focus then shifts to ensuring that the 
necessary safety-related crew interface, safety, and 
survivability requirements are met.  A prerequisite 
for a first crewed flight is confidence gained through 
understanding of the system design, development, 
analysis, and testing. It should be noted that the 
decision that crew is needed for a particular test or 
mission is primarily a programmatic decision 
(program and Agency management).  For the 
technical team, the focus must be on ensuring a safe 
and technically sound system.   
 
 
III. UNDERSTANDING AND MITIGATING 
RESIDUAL RISK 
 
III.I Focus on Crew Safety 
 
The process of designing, developing, and testing a 
new launch system is very complex and involves the 
spacecraft, launch vehicle, ground systems, mission 
systems, recovery systems, ground crews, and flight 
test crews.  The program teams have a wide-ranging 
responsibility to ensure the system is adequately 
assessed, tested, and deemed safe for human flight.  It 
is recognized that, despite the best efforts of the 
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vehicle team, early flights of new systems will entail 
some degree of residual risk.  Therefore, the focus 
should be on reducing and managing safety-related 
risk to the greatest extent practical.  Initial crewed 
missions must be conducted with a minimum of 
onboard personnel (either active or passive 
participants).  Such flights may warrant unique 
contingency procedures/capabilities that will preserve 
a safe return capability (i.e., above and beyond that 
required for the nominal design mission) utilizing 
specially trained crews.   
 
In order to focus to those items that are unique to the 
initial crew participation, it is assumed the 
system/operations design must preserve a safe return 
to Earth capability in the presence of any single 
failure in any critical functional capability to the 
maximum extent practical.  Safety issues, including 
providing for a safe crew return, should be separated 
from those needed only to enhance the mission.  
Mission enhancement functions of the crew are only 
considered to the extent that they affect safety.  
Figure 1 illustrates this concept.  Safety and crew 
survival (such as abort capability) functions are non-
negotiable and must be fully tested, verified, and 
validate prior to the first crewed flight.  For each 
specific test or mission, additional functions will be 
required to meet objectives that have been defined.  
Each subsequent test and mission may require 
additional capability.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Focus on Safety-related Items and Risks 
 
Functions that are critical for crew safety and 
survival must be established early in the design and 
development process.  These crew safety and survival 
functions should be formed into a set of non-
negotiable, first crewed flight requirements that form 
the basis for required design, development, testing, 
and V&V.  The following criterion is assumed as the 
basis for determining the minimum requirements that 
must be satisfied in allowing crew participation: 
System/operations design must preserve a safe return 
to Earth capability in the presence of any single 
credible failure in any critical functional path for the 
intended mission. 
 
The focus then shifts to determining what these 
safety-critical functions are and the degree to which 
they can be validated‡. 
 
 
III.II System Knowledge and Uncertainty Reduction 
 
Safety must be an inherent part of the design.  
Programs must establish requirements for each 
system’s specific design that will address safety-
related items (e.g., failure tolerance, risk of loss of 
crew and mission, overall system reliability).  A 
system-level focus on selection of simple and safe 
solutions to meet critical functions necessary to 
accomplish the mission is required.  These safety-
critical design requirements must be addressed prior 
to the first crewed flight.  Sound aerospace-
engineering practices for design, testing, and analysis 
must include all disciplines that affect any aspect of a 
safe design.  Examples include: propulsion; 
environmental control and life support; structures; 
mechanisms; materials; active/passive thermal; 
pyrotechnics; aerodynamics; flight mechanics; loads 
and dynamics; guidance, navigation, and control; 
electrical systems; avionics; software; thermal 
protection; crew systems; human factors; 
communication; space environments; ground 
operations; and flight operations.  In addition, design 
guidelines and standards associated with each 
technical and operational discipline must be 
considered relative to their effect on crew safety (e.g., 
margins, structural strength, and factors of safety).  
Including representation from those organizations 
that will operate the system (in flight and on the 
ground) is also important in the design of active 
                                                 
‡ Verification of a product shows proof of 
compliance with requirements. Validation of a 
product shows that the product accomplishes the 
intended purpose—and in the case of 
models/analysis, that models adequately predict the 
environment and match actual vehicle performance.  
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systems and user interfaces, as well as during system-
level testing. 
 
Gaining understanding of system design, operation, 
and performance (hence reducing risk) is traditionally 
accomplished through many factors that have been 
established as part of sound engineering practices.  
Figure 2 highlights areas that warrant particular 
attention when determining first crewed flight 
readiness.   
 
 
 
Figure 2: Major Contributors to Understanding 
Residual Risk for First Crewed Flight  
 
Given that the first crewed flight is likely to occur as 
part of the development process, extra consideration 
for crew safety must be given to the specific mission 
plan and vehicle configuration.  The flight test 
environment must be compared to previous test 
conditions/parameters and analysis assumptions.  
Understanding the environment in which the system 
will operate and how it will vary for different phases 
of the mission allows the system to be tested in 
relevant conditions and thus reduces uncertainty.  
Design and analysis should address full flight 
envelope operation of the spaceflight system’s design 
capability (including induced and natural 
environments) and failure/abort conditions.  
Examples: loads analyses for launch, ascent, orbit, 
entry, and landing (coupled loads analyses); 
strength/stress/margin assessments for critical load 
conditions; entry heating and thermal protection 
system performance; crew life support; propulsion 
systems; and trajectories. 
 
The flight hardware/software for test flights may, 
however, be in a different configuration than for 
operational flights, or may not be fully qualified.  It is 
imperative that these differences be identified and 
thoroughly evaluated to fully understand the residual 
risk.  The key areas that require specific attention and 
scrutiny include: 
 
 Configuration of the vehicle for flight test 
versus previous tests  
 Fidelity, assumptions, and validation of 
models versus flight configuration 
 Analyzed configuration versus flight 
configuration 
 Certification level and fidelity of 
hardware/software installed for flight test 
 
A review of the specific flight configuration should 
be conducted, along with the implications of test 
results and anomaly resolutions from previous testing 
and analyses.  Specific analyses may be performed 
for the mission, to include any potential 
contingencies.  It is critical, however, to understand 
the assumptions and fidelity of the models being 
used, and where the results are valid for that 
particular flight configuration.  Accepting data from 
models that are not validated within the range of 
operation can be problematic.   
 
Another area that poses a potential problem for a first 
crewed flight is the certification level or fidelity of 
hardware/software installed on the vehicle for that 
flight (and of the ground systems used to support and 
operate the vehicle/mission).  Due to timing and the 
requirements for the specific mission, engineering 
and/or prototype equipment may be used.  Additional 
test instrumentation may also be part of the mission 
configuration.  A decision to use an uncertified or 
off-nominal configuration requires a thorough 
review, including an assessment of any possible 
unintended interactions.  
 
Managing margins is critical to the vehicle design 
and development.   In this case, a margin is the 
difference between the design requirements 
(including factors of safety) and the system’s actual 
performance capability in the worst-case environment 
and operating states.  Examples of areas where 
margins are important include power, mass, delta-
velocity, structure, and many others.  Decision 
makers must understand the margins of each system 
before making a first flight decision.  Planned 
operations are often placarded to stay within system 
capabilities, especially in the early development 
flights (in some cases, such as launch, it is difficult to 
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gain margin via placards; propulsion systems may 
operate near maximum levels on every mission).  
Through effective testing and proper processing, the 
actual system capability can be determined.  Each 
development flight test provides increased knowledge 
and reduces uncertainty within the cleared envelope 
of operation—allowing for incremental envelope 
expansion as more measurements are obtained and 
analytical tools are validated.  Figure 3 illustrates this 
concept.  The outer oval represents the operational 
system capability or “designed to” envelope, as built 
up/validated over the course of the test program.  A 
robust, reliable, and safe design incorporates the 
ability to test specific points of the design where 
lower margins, high risk, etc., occur due to new 
technology, use of previous technology in an untested 
environment, or other factors.  As in most systems, 
the amount of margin varies.  In some cases the 
system is quite robust (i.e., large positive margin), in 
other areas there is very little margin (see Figure 3).  
Greater margins are required where there is large 
uncertainty in the design and environments.  
Understanding the margins, to the maximum extent 
practical, is vital in determining the safety of first 
crewed flight. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Understanding Margins and Incremental 
System Capability Validation 
 
Minimizing risk goes beyond meeting requirements 
and adhering to established standards.  It requires 
exploring what can go wrong and developing 
mitigations that either eliminate or reduce the ensuing 
residual risk to acceptable levels in the as-built 
system, including where uncertainties might reduce 
margins to unsafe levels along the flight envelope.  
Providing sufficient margin is an essential part of 
mitigating uncertainty and performing a safe mission.  
Prior to crewed flight, the system’s performance and 
operating margin relative to the natural and induced 
environments must be anchored by validated 
analysis/modeling and/or testing.   
 
Knowledge of the design process improves 
understanding of the limitations of analysis 
techniques—as it is these limitations that are critical 
to understanding the risk and ultimately the safety of 
the system.  The results from analytical tools are 
dependent on the accuracy of the models and the 
methods of calculation.  While most results can be 
calculated to multiple significant figures, most 
models do not have that level of accuracy of the 
actual system/hardware.  Many of the models may be 
approximations due to limited knowledge of the 
physics, external environment, systems, or limited 
resources.  These tools have enormous potential for 
improving the development process once their results 
are validated by experimentation in each specific 
application.  Furthermore, since these model 
formulations can be manipulated to match 
experimental data at a given condition, they cannot 
be considered accurate until the same formulation is 
used under multiple plausible conditions.  Such 
validation can, to a large degree, be accomplished 
through ground testing, but there are several classes 
of measurements that can only be obtained with 
accuracy in flight (acoustics, aero-thermal, induced 
environments, etc.).   
 
A critical test list is a key tool for determining when 
a vehicle is ready for flight.  This list contains the 
tests, along with success criteria, that must be 
completed to reduce the system risk to an acceptable 
level and would cover the non-negotiable items. This 
list should be created early in the development 
process.  While the overall test requirements will be 
fluid over the course of the program, changes to this 
critical test list should be rare and only done after 
much debate and agreement among the team.  
Adhering to the list will help guard against the 
pressures of limited resources (time and budget) that 
programs often face during development.   
 
The progression from analysis to ground test and then 
to flight test (uncrewed and then crewed) is also the 
progression of the fidelity of data that can be 
generated.  Ideally, safety-critical and survival 
functions would be tested and verified through 
ground tests. This is not always possible, as flight 
environments and potential interactions cannot 
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always be anticipated and replicated on the ground.  
Any safety-critical function that must operate (or 
must not operate) during a crewed mission must be 
verified and validated to an accepted confidence level 
prior to the first crewed flight.  Flight and ground 
tests must have similar instrumentation and be in the 
same locations, as much as is practical, to compare 
data and allow the flight test to validate the ground 
test and the analysis.  A single measurement in any of 
the testing may not be sufficient to validate the 
system or model.   
 
To understand the uncertainty, and for the flight risk 
to be accepted, sufficient test measurements are 
needed to verify the environment, confirm the 
analysis, and confirm location of flight 
measurements.  Flight tests should include: definition 
of flight test reference missions, objectives, flight-
specific functions, performance, and verification 
requirements; and assessment of all waivers, 
deviations, and exceptions.  Finally, the program 
should ensure the resolution of anomalies from 
previous ground and flight tests and identify 
deviations from previous tests and baseline design. 
 
 
III.III Proven Means of Return to Earth 
 
A safe return to Earth from any stage of a mission, 
including launch, must be ensured through 
contingency capabilities and procedures to the 
maximum practical extent.  Careful thought must be 
given to the entire mission with the goal of always 
being able to return the crew safely to Earth.  In 
addition, it must be verified that the intended mission 
can be controlled, with uncertainties, to remain 
within the flight envelope validated for that mission. 
 
Launch through the atmosphere inherently poses a 
tightly constrained flight envelope due to the rapid 
release of large amounts of energy by the propulsion 
system, significant aerodynamic loading, and the fact 
that structural loads may be at their maximum for the 
launch vehicle and some spacecraft components.  
Therefore, early human spaceflight designs provided 
some form of “last resort” escape from the launch 
vehicle during the period from liftoff through 
maximum dynamic pressure (max q-bar), transonic 
transition, stage separation, and the establishment of 
a functioning upper stage.  Because the range of 
unacceptable conditions is impossible to define with 
complete confidence, emergency system designs 
cannot ensure success in every conceivable case, but 
portions of the envelope can and must be verified and 
validated to be safe for supporting human flight.  If a 
launch escape capability is available, it should not be 
factored into reliability considerations but serve as a 
last resort to preserve the life of the crew.   
 
The Space Shuttle configuration, unlike the small 
crew capsules used in the early programs, precluded 
reliance on escape systems while its solid rocket 
boosters (SRBs) were burning.  Because SRB thrust 
termination designs introduced additional safety 
risks, the design team elected to invest the resources 
necessary to provide assurance that the entire launch 
system could be treated, like primary structure, as 
having a reliability of 1.0 from ignition through SRB 
separation.  The fact that an unrecognized 
combination of environments subsequently resulted 
in a catastrophe does not, by itself, invalidate the 
selected design approach.  Rather, this tragic event 
reinforced the importance of meticulously monitoring 
flight and test data relentlessly pursuing, 
understanding, and resolving every out of family (not 
just out of specification) measurement.   
 
Knowledge of the system and understanding of the 
residual risks are gained as a system evolves.  Each 
step of the design, development, assembly, 
integration, and test process builds the body of 
evidence the decision makers can use to determine 
the acceptability of the residual risks.  Therefore, the 
decision of first flight must be considered, planned, 
and assessed at each step of the process.  An 
important part of this overall process is maintaining 
and encouraging the open discussions and debates 
within the entire program team—and maintaining a 
healthy tension between the program and technical 
authorities, operations and design, systems and 
disciplines, etc. 
 
 
IV. CONFIDENCE 
 
An important consideration in determining when it is 
safe to put crews in a human spaceflight system is the 
overall level of confidence that the decision makers 
have in the system.  For this discussion the subjective 
confidence is based on engineering judgment, not 
statistical projections.  Decision makers gain 
confidence through a combination of several tangible 
and intangible means.  Some examples and 
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descriptions of contributing factors are provided in 
the following sections.   
 
IV.I Design Maturity and Simplicity 
 
The use of ‘proven’ hardware/software and designs 
can provide increased confidence, assuming similar 
environments, conditions, applications, etc.  
However, the design team should be cautious in using 
‘heritage’ and ‘off the shelf’ hardware and software.  
The use of these proven systems must be analyzed 
and verified for use in new environments and 
applications.  Designs that have additional safety 
margins at the component, system, or operations 
levels, as previously described, may also merit 
increased confidence. 
 
Systems that employ inherently simpler designs, 
fewer interfaces, and large margins to meet their 
needs will likely increase confidence in their ability 
to perform safely and reliably.  For example, the 
Space Shuttle drops its landing gear by releasing 
retention hooks and allowing gravity and air loads to 
deploy the landing gear, avoiding hydraulic or other 
actuating power devices.  Complexity should only be 
added when there is benefit such as in weight, 
volume, performance, or operations. 
 
 
IV.II Verification and Validation 
 
V&V are essential for developing a safe human 
spaceflight system.  When determining if a vehicle is 
ready for crewed flight, a review of the V&V 
program should be conducted. A complete and 
thorough test program will increase confidence in 
mission success.  When a vehicle or system has a 
significant history of testing prior to the current 
program and the configuration, operational 
environment, and performance parameters are similar 
enough, the applicable historical test data and 
analyses may be used for verification and can also 
increase confidence in the system.  Analytical design 
tools, validated with experimental data over a range 
of conditions, provide the most confidence. 
 
The test program should always include end-to-end 
testing and integrate humans, hardware, and software 
to the degree needed to sufficiently understand the 
dynamics of interaction, control risk and gain 
confidence in the integrated system.  
IV.III Program Team 
 
The experience and longevity of the program team 
are significant confidence builders in development of 
a successful human spaceflight system.  
 
Confidence is enhanced when program management 
and supporting members of the program team (such 
as Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and 
Medical) are responsible for ensuring an appropriate 
emphasis on safety during the design, development, 
and testing of the launch vehicle, spacecraft, launch-
abort system, mission operations, ground operations, 
manufacturing, and other areas.  
 
Teams consisting of members with significant 
design/development experience in the fields they 
currently support and who have already been through 
major design, development, and testing campaigns 
provide increased confidence.  A strong systems 
engineering focus is also important in understanding 
and managing the interfaces and interactions—of 
both the design and the team. 
 
Confidence increases when decision makers insist on 
personal accountability (ownership) for the end 
results; good communication between team members; 
and operation in an open, positive environment.  As 
stated earlier, maintaining and encouraging open 
discussions and debates within the entire team—and 
maintaining a healthy tension between the program 
and technical authorities, operations and design, 
systems and disciplines, etc., is an important part of 
developing confidence.  Ideally, the team should be 
organized so that the decision-making authority is 
delegated to the hardware/system design level, 
thereby allowing timely decisions to be made.  
However, final accountability remains with the 
program and Agency managers.  All decisions must 
consider safety first and be based on a balance of 
sound technical and programmatic rationale.  It is 
important to note that organizations should have an 
alternate reporting path or governance structure that 
ensures safety and technical concerns are addressed.    
 
It should be emphasized that hardware/software and 
system contractors are an essential part of the 
program team.  The contract should allow open 
communication and individual responsibility.  Since 
most hardware and software elements are provided 
by prime and sub-tier contractors, careful attention 
must be paid to the applicable statements of work, 
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terms, and conditions to make sure that they motivate 
all parties to ensure safety and reliability.  Some 
contract incentives may drive behavior contrary to 
what is desired.  A simplified example would be if all 
award fees are based on simply meeting milestones—
schedule pressure could take precedence over 
technical matters. 
 
 
IV.IV Program Processes 
 
For any complex program, established, efficient, 
effective, and documented processes are essential to 
define how the program functions.  Understanding 
and ensuring proper program processes and outcomes 
will help determine the level of confidence.   
 
Examples of processes to be analyzed include 
technical reporting/authority, technical checks and 
balances, S&MA practices, integration, and 
documentation.  For instance, decision makers may 
gain confidence when the team has clearly defined 
and understood roles and responsibilities; a strategy 
for independent reviews and reporting; well-
established risk management practices that identify 
and eliminate, reduce, or mitigate risks; readily 
available and up-to-date documentation; and 
documented rationale of major decisions. 
 
 
IV.V Demonstrated Record of Success  
 
Human spaceflight systems typically have well-
documented design processes, with thorough 
engineering standards and processes.  Some systems, 
however, may offer limited access to detailed design 
information. These systems may have different 
design and verification approaches, as well as 
differing processes, documentation, or quality-control 
plans.  From a confidence-building standpoint, these 
kinds of differences and potential shortcomings may 
well be offset, in part, by a demonstrated launch 
performance record.  This concept may apply to 
complete human spaceflight systems, such as the 
Russian Soyuz, or components or subsystems, such 
as the RD-180 rocket engine.   
 
An existing system or subsystem may add to the 
confidence of decision makers if it has established a 
sound flight record in a similar configuration or 
operation, or if it has undergone related systems 
testing.  Successful components or systems may 
function or operate within specific parameters but if 
those components or systems are introduced into new 
parameters, their continued success cannot be 
assumed unless appropriate testing using these new 
parameters is performed.  Decision makers should be 
cautious if components or systems that were 
successful in previous programs are now used in 
environments for which they were not designed or 
tested. In addition, understanding of all past 
anomalies is essential.   
 
It is important to note that decision makers must 
remember that past success does not automatically 
translate to future success.   Previous flight history is 
only one factor in building confidence - it is not 
sufficient by itself to determine readiness for a first 
crewed flight. When using these previously flown 
systems or components, it is vital that the technical 
team has a sound basis for confidence in their 
continued success.  Every system will present its own 
unique set of circumstances that must be thoughtfully 
considered in a manner consistent with the principles 
described in this paper.  In the end, the technical team 
will be accountable for the final results. 
 
 
IV.VI Independent Input and Perspective 
 
Throughout the process, program and Agency 
management should seek out and integrate input from 
competent, current, and independent review teams.  It 
is important that they review the program throughout 
its life cycle and have relevant insight into and 
knowledge of the design in order to make sound 
observations and recommendations.  However, care 
should be taken that the review team retains their 
independence and maintains a balance between close 
participation and independence.  In addition, 
independent technical assessments of new 
technologies, new developments, and expected high-
risk areas should be performed throughout the life 
cycle. 
 
Confidence is not a number or a data point.  Decision 
makers must develop confidence to safely launch 
humans by working closely with the entire program 
team throughout the process of designing, building, 
and testing the vehicle.   
 
The factors outlined above, along with others, 
contribute to building confidence in the human 
spaceflight system’s ability to fly a crew safely.  
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Overall confidence is a combination of many 
considerations and it is important that the 
contributing factors chosen encompass the entire 
system, including the launch vehicle and 
ground/mission systems.  Readiness for crewed flight 
operations will always be an integrated judgment call 
based on the decision makers’ experience, 
knowledge, and level of confidence in the system. 
 
 
V. SUMMARY 
 
The key points in this paper can be viewed as 
questions that a decision maker may ask throughout 
the process of designing, building, and testing a new 
crewed vehicle.  Some of these questions include (but 
are not limited to): 
 
 Are adequate safety features inherent in the 
design? 
 Does the design preserve a safe return to 
Earth in the event of a single credible 
failure? 
 Are the design requirements of the entire 
system understood and implemented? 
 Does the team thoroughly understand the 
design and configuration? 
 Has sufficient knowledge been gained 
through adequate design, analysis, and 
testing? 
 Have models been thoroughly validated with 
physical data? 
 Are hazards adequately identified and 
controlled, including across systems and 
interfaces, to the maximum extent practical? 
 Have the safety-critical and survival 
functions been identified, verified and 
validated prior to the first crewed flight 
(including test flights)?  
 Have the program management and 
technical teams worked together and has 
there been open communication of issues 
throughout the lifecycle? 
 Has the first crewed flight decision been 
considered at each step of the lifecycle? 
 Has confidence been developed throughout 
the lifecycle and used in making an 
informed judgment? 
 When decisions were made, did the team 
focus on showing how those decisions affect 
overall safety and risk? 
 Are the program, engineering, S&MA, and 
operations teams in agreement for system 
readiness of a first crewed flight? 
 
The process of determining readiness for a first 
crewed flight is dependent on the specific system and 
mission.  In general terms, the vehicle is ready to fly 
when it has been deemed safe and when any residual 
risk has been mitigated to the point that it is 
outweighed by the need for a crew.  This decision is 
ultimately the judgment of the program and Agency 
management in conjunction with the design and 
operations team.   
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